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The present review aims to summarize the debate in contemporary neuroscience
between inborn and experience-dependent models of conceptual representations that
goes back to the description of category-specific semantic disorders for biological and
artifact categories. Experience-dependent models suggest that categorical disorders are
the by-product of the differential weighting of different sources of knowledge in the
representation of biological and artifact categories. These models maintain that semantic
disorders are not really category-specific, because they do not respect the boundaries
between different categories. They also argue that the brain structures which are disrupted
in a given type of category-specific semantic disorder should correspond to the areas of
convergence of the sensory-motor information which play a major role in the construction
of that category. Furthermore, they provide a simple interpretation of gender-related
categorical effects and are supported by studies assessing the importance of prior
experience in the cortical representation of objects On the other hand, inborn models
maintain that category-specific semantic disorders reflect the disruption of innate brain
networks, which are shaped by natural selection to allow rapid identification of objects
that are very relevant for survival. From the empirical point of view, these models are
mainly supported by observations of blind subjects, which suggest that visual experience
is not necessary for the emergence of category-specificity in the ventral stream of visual
processing. The weight of the data supporting experience-dependent and inborn models
is thoroughly discussed, stressing the fact observations made in blind subjects are still
the subject of intense debate. It is concluded that at the present state of knowledge it is
not possible to choose between experience-dependent and inborn models of conceptual
representations.
Keywords: category-specific semantic disorders, sensory-motor model of semantic knowledge, domains of
knowledge hypothesis, role of experience in the representation of objects, inborn models of conceptual
representations
INTRODUCTION
Contemporary debates about the foundations of categories and
concepts have very ancient roots. Indeed, discussions about the
nature of concepts, which have tried to clarify whether or not
they are essentially grounded in our senses and in our actions
with objects, go back to the early days of Plato and Aristotle
(Kiefer and Pulvermüller, 2012; Markie, 2013). According to Plato
and other rationalist philosophers concepts are mental entities
and are fundamentally distinct from sensory impressions. By
contrast, according to Aristotle and other empiricist philosophers
all concepts are derived from sensory experiences. The rationalist
position has been endorsed in more recent years by Pylyshyn
(1973), Fodor (1975), Caramazza et al. (1990) and Patterson
and Hodges (2000). These authors proposed the existence of a
unitary, abstract and amodal semantic system, that is accessed
by the highest levels of the various perceptual modalities
(“structural descriptions”), which include a complete perceptual
specification of objects prior to their meaningful recognition.
According to the above mentioned cognitive authors, there are
no traces of the various sensory-motor modalities beyond the
level of the corresponding “structural descriptions”, because
the format of semantic representations is symbolic, abstract,
amodal and propositional. On the contrary, the “empirical”
line of thought has been endorsed in recent years by Allport
(1985) and Jackendoff (1987). These authors challenged the
model of an abstract and amodal conceptual/semantic system.
They claimed that conceptual representations keep the stamp
of the perceptual mechanisms through which they were formed
and are stored in the same format in which they were
constructed by the sensory-motor experience. Drawing in part
on the latter cognitive models and in part on Hebb’s (1949)
model of “cell assemblies”, Damasio (1989, 1990), proposed
the dynamic construct of “higher-order convergence zones”,
which assumes that concepts are retrieved by a process of
recollection of modality-specific bits of memories, that are
stored near the sensory portals and motor output sites of
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the system. Damasio’s (1989, 1990) construct of “higher-order
convergence zones” was refined by Barsalou (1999, 2008), who
added the similarity-in-topography (SIT) principle (Simmons
and Barsalou, 2003), according to which the proximity of two
conjunctive neurons in a convergence zone increases with the
similarity of the features they conjoin. As a result, conjunctive
neurons become topographically organized into local regions
that represent properties and categories. From the viewpoint
of the cognitive neurosciences, an important difference between
the rationalist and the empiricist approach concerns the fact
that these two lines of thought have different neurobiological
implications concerning the anatomical correlates of conceptual
representations. The rationalist approach, which assumes that
conceptual categories are represented in an abstract and amodal
format, has no reason to make predictions about the brain
structures subsuming concepts in general or specific categories of
knowledge. On the other hand, the empiricist approach, which
assumes that conceptual categories result from the convergence in
specific cortical areas of sensory-motor information that plays a
leading role in the construction of each category, allows making
predictions based on what is known about the brain structures
processing this sensory-motor information.
In the following sections of this survey, I will first
consider the neuropsychological data about category-specific
semantic disorders on which all the theoretical models and
the controversies among these models are based. Then I will
identify the brain structures that process the sensory-motor
information on which our knowledge of different categories
could be based and their involvement in category-specific
semantic disorders. My next step will be to analyze the
arguments of inborn and experience-dependent models of
categorical brain organization, including their interpretation of
gender-related effects in category-specific semantic disorders
and of the relationships between tool knowledge and the left
ventral fronto-parietal areas. In this section I will discuss data
which suggest that innate connectivity patterns mediate the
integration of information critical for the organization of each
category. Finally, I will survey experimental data supporting the
importance of prior experience in the cortical representation of
objects.
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF CATEGORY-SPECIFIC
DISORDERS TEND TO SUPPORT SENSORIMOTOR MODELS
OF SEMANTIC KNOWLEDGE
THE DISCOVERY OF “CATEGORY-SPECIFIC” SEMANTIC DISORDERS
The data on category-specific semantic disorders, on which
all of the following theoretical models (and in particular the
empiricists’ predictions) are based, can be traced back to a
seminal series of papers in which Warrington et al. showed
that the disruption of conceptual knowledge is not necessarily
homogeneous across categories but is sometimes “category-
specific” (Warrington and McCarthy, 1983, 1987; Warrington
and Shallice, 1984). These category-specific semantic disorders
usually affect the biological (“living”) more than the artifact
(“non-living”) categories, but sometimes preferentially impair the
artifact categories (see Saffran and Schwartz, 1994; Gainotti et al.,
1995; Gainotti, 2000, 2005; Capitani et al., 2003 for reviews).
Warrington et al. (Warrington and McCarthy, 1983, 1987;
Warrington and Shallice, 1984) also noticed that in their patients
the semantic disorders did not respect the boundaries between
biological and artifact categories. For instance, the representation
of “body parts” tended to be disrupted in association with the
representation of artifact categories, whereas the representation
of “musical instruments” tended to be disrupted in association
with the representation of living items. This was explained as
due to the fact that our knowledge of animals and musical
knowledge is based on similar visual (shape) and acoustic (sound)
information, whereas our knowledge of body parts and tools (or
other artifacts) is mainly based on actions and somato-sensory
information. More generally, these observations suggested that
“category-specific semantic disorders” are not due to disruption
of true “biological” and “artifact” categories, but are rather the
by-product of a more basic dichotomy, concerning the differential
weighting that visual-perceptual and functional attributes have
in the representation of biological and, respectively, artifact
categories. Warrington’s model (which has been called “the
differential weighting hypothesis”) is based on the assumption
that each conceptual representation derives from the convergence
of different sensory, motor and verbal features, but that the
weight of these features is different for different conceptual
categories. For example, the distinction between a lion, a tiger
and a leopard is mainly based on visual features, namely the
plain, striped or spotted aspect of their skin. On the other hand,
tools and other artifacts are distinguished by making reference
to the actions they require and the functions they support and
only marginally to their visual features. As the weight of the
features that converge in a conceptual representation is related
to the subject’s experience, this model implies that conceptual
representations are experience-dependent. Furthermore, since
Warrington et al. had maintained that our knowledge of
biological entities is mainly based upon their perceptual features,
whereas our knowledge of artifacts in mainly based upon
their function, this model was called the Sensory/Functional
Theory/SFT.
OBJECTIONS RAISED TO THE SENSORY/FUNCTIONAL THEORY AND
EMERGENCE OF THE “SENSORY-MOTOR MODELS OF SEMANTIC
KNOWLEDGE”
Several objections were raised against the SFT by Caramazza
et al. (e.g., Caramazza, 1998; Caramazza and Shelton, 1998;
Capitani et al., 2003; Mahon and Caramazza, 2003; Caramazza
and Mahon, 2006) and by other authors following a similar line
of thought. The first objection was that there is no consistent
correlation between conceptual impairment for living things and
greater disruption of visual knowledge compared with functional
knowledge (see Caramazza, 1998; Caramazza and Shelton, 1998;
Mahon and Caramazza, 2001; Capitani et al., 2003 for discussion).
There are, however, cases of intensively studied patients with
category-specific semantic impairments for living things (e.g.,
Basso et al., 1988; Sartori and Job, 1988; Silveri and Gainotti,
1988; De Renzi and Lucchelli, 1994; Gainotti and Silveri, 1996;
Rosazza et al., 2003) in whom the disproportionate impairment
of the visual (i.e., compared with the functional) attributes
predicted by the SFT, has been confirmed. On the other hand,
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the review by Capitani et al. (2003) raised methodological issues
with some of those studies and the study by Rosazza et al.
(2003) was challenged by Mahon and Caramazza (2004). In any
case, the comparison between visual and functional knowledge
of living beings is hindered by the need to define what is the
meaning of a “functional” attribute when dealing with animals,
in particular wild animals. More generally, “functional features”
are a heterogeneous class of properties that includes actions
accomplished with objects, notions about the objects’ use and
verbally-mediated encyclopedic knowledge. This fact has been
stressed, for instance, by Buxbaum et al. (2000), Buxbaum and
Saffran (2002) and Boronat et al. (2005), who have distinguished,
within functional knowledge, the function of an object from its
manipulation, suggesting that since “manipulation” is related to
a sensorimotor activity, it could be the component most tightly
linked to the “differential weighting” hypothesis. Furthermore,
the same authors showed that not only the properties denoted
by the term “functional” are heterogeneous, but also those
subsumed by the term “sensory” because different types of
sensory data could have different weights in different kinds
of semantic categories. Thus, visual perception could play
a leading role in the mental representation of animals and
somatosensory data in that of tools. These considerations led
several authors (e.g., Gainotti et al., 1995; Chao et al., 1999;
Gainotti, 2000, 2006; Martin et al., 2000; Martin and Chao,
2001; Martin, 2007; Barsalou, 2008) to suggest that the “sensory-
functional theory” should be replaced with the “embodied
cognition” theory (Barsalou, 2008) or with the “sensory-motor
model of semantic knowledge”, (Gainotti et al., 1995; Chao
et al., 1999; Gainotti, 2000, 2006; Martin et al., 2000; Martin
and Chao, 2001; Martin, 2007). The latter takes into account
various kinds of perceptual, functional, motor and verbally-
coded properties, that can contribute to the construction of a
conceptual representation. Other important models that have
tried to explain the differences between biological and artifact
categories on the basis of the different set of underlying features
and of their interconnections are the correlated feature based
(CFB) accounts (e.g., Tyler et al., 2000; Tyler and Moss, 2001;
Randall et al., 2004; Bright et al., 2005, 2007; Taylor et al.,
2009, 2011). These models underline the different levels of
interconnections that exist between shared (perceptual and
functional) attributes of living and non-living things and assume
that this structural difference is more important than the
differential weighting of perceptual and functional attributes in
explaining category-specific semantic disorders. Although these
models are interesting, they will not be taken into account here
because they would not allow us to make clear predictions
about the experience-dependent vs. innate models of conceptual
representations.
OBJECTIONS TO WARRINGTON’S “DIFFERENTIAL WEIGHTING
HYPOTHESIS”
The second objection raised by Caramazza et al. to the SFT
is that the assumption of differential weighting of sensory and
functional information in the representation of living things and
artifacts is not systematically confirmed by studies conducted
in normal subjects. In fact, Farah and McClelland (1991) and
Caramazza and Shelton (1998) obtained conflicting results when
they tried to assess the weight of different kinds of information
in the representation of different conceptual categories in healthy
subjects, by asking them to underline either visual or functional
descriptors in dictionary definitions of living things or artifacts.
Farah and McClelland (1991) found a much larger ratio of visual
to functional attributes for living beings than for artifacts, whereas
Caramazza and Shelton (1998) found only a non significant
difference between these two domains of knowledge. These results
were discrepant because in Farah and McClelland’s (1991) study a
property was considered “functional” only if it described “what
the item does or what it is for,” whereas in Caramazza and
Shelton’s (1998) study all “non-sensorial” (namely functional,
encyclopedic, etc.) descriptors were contrasted with the sensory
properties. Feature lists were used by other authors (e.g., McRae
and Cree, 2002; Cree and McRae, 2003; Vanoverberghe and
Storms, 2003; Ventura et al., 2005; Zannino et al., 2006) to
check the assumption of a differential weighting of sensory and
functional information in the representation of living things
and artifacts. These studies have generally provided an empirical
support for the claim that sensory and functional features have
different importance in the representation of living and non-
living entities, but, as Hoffman and Lambon Ralph (2013) have
rightly noted, feature lists may not give a complete picture of
how knowledge is distributed amongst the various sensory-motor
modalities available from our experience of the environment.
Much more appropriate for testing the principles of the “sensory-
motor model of conceptual knowledge” is a method proposed
by Tranel et al. (1997b) and used by Gainotti et al. (2009,
2013a) and Hoffman and Lambon Ralph (2013). This method
consists of asking normal subjects to evaluate (with Likert
scales) the influence of different perceptual (visual, auditory,
tactual, olfactory, and gustative) and motor activities, as well
as encyclopedic information, in the mental representation of
living and artifact categories. Using this procedure, all these
authors showed: (a) that normal subjects consider the visual
modality the main source of knowledge for all (biological and
artifact) categories taken into account; and (b) that in biological
categories the most important source of knowledge after vision
is represented by other perceptual modalities, whereas in artifact
categories it is represented by the actions performed with
objects.
Apart from the major importance attributed to vision in the
mental representation of every kind of concrete entity (which is
not surprising if we consider that most of our knowledge of the
world is acquired through this sensory modality) other perceptual
data therefore prevailed in the representation of biological
entities, whereas actions and somatosensory data prevailed in the
representation of artifact categories. Taken together, all these data
suggest that the greatest difference between living and artifact
categories does not reside in the prominent role played by
vision in the representation of living beings, and by functional
features in the representation of artifacts, but in the interaction
between visual data and other perceptual (auditory, olfactory, and
gustatory) attributes in the case of living beings, and among visual
data, action-related properties, and somato-sensory information,
in the case of artifacts.
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THE HYPOTHESIS OF AN “INNATE” CATEGORICAL ORGANIZATION OF
CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE
The third more general objection raised by Caramazza et al.
(e.g., Caramazza, 1998; Caramazza and Shelton, 1998; Mahon
and Caramazza, 2001, 2003; Capitani et al., 2003; Caramazza and
Mahon, 2006) to the SFT (and other similar models) concerns
the assumption that “category-specific semantic disorders” may
be due to the different weight of different sources of knowledge
in the construction of different categories, rather than to
the disruption of true “biological” and “artifact” categories.
Caramazza et al. labeled their interpretation of category-specific
semantic disorders “the domains of knowledge’ hypothesis”;
this model assumes the existence of an “innate” categorical
organization of conceptual knowledge. More specifically, the
“domains of knowledge” hypothesis’ posits that category-
specific impairments for animals (potential predators), plant life
(possible source of food), and artifacts reflect the disruption
of innate brain networks, shaped by natural selection to
support rapid identification of objects very relevant for survival.
Thus, Caramazza et al. (e.g., Caramazza, 1998; Caramazza and
Shelton, 1998; Capitani et al., 2003; Mahon and Caramazza,
2003; Caramazza and Mahon, 2006) questioned Warrington
et al.’s (Warrington and McCarthy, 1983, 1987; Warrington and
Shallice, 1984) statement that in their patients the semantic
disorders did not respect the boundaries between biological and
artifact categories, because the representation of “body parts”
tended to be disrupted in association with that of artifacts,
whereas the representation of “musical instruments” tended to be
disrupted together with that of living items. These observations
of Warrington et al. were, however, confirmed by several authors.
For instance, Basso et al. (1988), Damasio (1990), Breedin et al.
(1994), Farah et al. (1996), Silveri and Gainotti (1988) and Dixon
et al. (2000) confirmed the association between living beings
and musical instruments. Similarly, Basso et al. (1988), Hillis
and Caramazza (1991), Goldenberg (1992), Hart and Gordon
(1992), Breedin et al. (1994), De Renzi and Lucchelli (1994),
Forde et al. (1997), Humphreys et al. (1997), Silveri and Gainotti
(1988) and Kolinsky et al. (2002) confirmed the association
between artifacts and body parts. However, Barbarotto et al.
(2001) and Capitani et al. (2003) considered these results as
spurious and due to the influence of unmatched “nuisance”
variables, such as familiarity, age of acquisition and lexical
frequency. On the other hand, this interpretation is at variance
with data reported by Dixon et al. (2000), who confirmed
the particular status of musical instruments, by using lists of
living beings, artifacts and musical instruments that were well
controlled for frequency, stimulus complexity and familiarity
and by Masullo et al. (2012). Using a Semantic Knowledge
Questionnaire (Laiacona et al., 1993), these authors studied a
patient affected by a severe apperceptive visual agnosia, and found
that the number of errors made on the musical instruments
was similar to that obtained on the living categories of animals,
fruits and vegetables and significantly higher of that made in
the other artifact categories. This difference was still significant
when familiarity, frequency of use and prototypicality of each
stimulus entered into a logistic regression analysis. Furthermore,
these clinical data were confirmed by experiments conducted
with a neural network model (Gales et al., 2001), in which
living things and musical instruments elicited greater recognition
failures than the other categories. The discrepancy between the
different accounts of the associations between biological entities
and “musical instruments” given by the “sensory-motor model
of semantic knowledge” and by the “domains of knowledge
hypothesis”, is probably due to the fact that only a partial overlap
exists between the sources of knowledge typical of these domains.
Thus, visual and auditory attributes play an important role in
the representation of both animals and musical instruments, but
visual attributes are more important for animals and auditory
features for musical instruments. Furthermore, motion is typical
of animals, but not of musical instruments. Depending on the
exact lesion location and accuracy in the control of nuisance
variables, it is therefore possible that the association between
animals and musical instruments may be due to joint disruption
of their representations or to the influence of uncontrolled
nuisance variables.
In conclusion, neuropsychological data are rather consistent
with the “sensory-motor model of semantic knowledge”, because
the main assumption of this model, namely the hypothesis
that various kinds of perceptual, motor and verbally-coded
properties may have differential weighting in the construction
of different conceptual categories, is strongly supported by
empirical data (e.g., Cree and McRae, 2003; Vigliocco et al.,
2004; Gainotti et al., 2009, 2013a; Hoffman and Lambon Ralph,
2013). However, the “domains of knowledge hypothesis” raises
important methodological objections to interpretations of the
neuropsychological data based on the “differential weighting
hypothesis”.
THE SENSORIMOTOR MODELS OF SEMANTIC KNOWLEDGE
ALLOW EXPLAINING THE CEREBRAL CORRELATES OF
BIOLOGICAL AND ARTIFACT CATEGORIES
ANATOMICAL CORRELATES OF CATEGORY-SPECIFIC SEMANTIC
DISORDERS
Gainotti et al. (1995), Martin et al. (1996) and Gainotti
(2000) were the first authors to suggest that the anatomical
locus of lesion in category-specific semantic disorders might
be informative about the nature of the underlying cognitive
impairment. The title of Gainotti’s (2000) paper (“What the
locus of brain lesion tells us about the nature of the cognitive
defect underlying category-specific disorders”) explicitly stressed
this point, which had been hitherto neglected because previous
(cognitively oriented) authors (e.g., Warrington and Shallice,
1984; Hart et al., 1985; Warrington and McCarthy, 1987; Sartori
and Job, 1988), who had reported the anatomical locus of lesions
in their patients, had not proposed a general interpretation
of the relationships between clinical and anatomical data.
Gainotti (2000) argued that, if distinctive sources of knowledge
play a critical role in the construction of different semantic
categories, then the brain structures disrupted in a given type
of category-specific semantic disorder should correspond to
the areas of convergences of the sensory-motor information
which has played a major role in the construction of that
category. More specifically, the anterior parts of the temporal
lobes (where the ventral stream of visual processing converges
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with auditory, olfactory and gustatory inputs) should play a
critical role in the representation of biological entities; and
the fronto-temporo-parietal, sensory-motor cortices (where the
dorsal stream of visual processing converges with body-related
and action-oriented structures) should play a major role in the
representation of artifacts. Furthermore, a different degree of
lateralization of the brain representation of biological entities
and artifacts should be predicted, because the main sources
of knowledge about living beings (namely visual and other
perceptual inputs) are bilaterally represented, whereas (in right-
handed subjects) the action oriented structures, which provide
an important source of knowledge about artifacts, are mainly
represented in the left hemisphere, which controls the movements
of the right side of the body. Both of these predictions are
substantiated by a number of anatomo-clinical and neuroimaging
studies. Several reviews of the anatomical correlates of category-
specific semantic disorders (e.g., Saffran and Schwartz, 1994;
Gainotti et al., 1995; Damasio et al., 1996; Tranel et al., 1997a;
Gainotti, 2000, 2005, 2006; Capitani et al., 2003), have, indeed,
confirmed the critical role played by lesions of the anterior
parts of the temporal lobes in semantic disorders for biological
entities. These reviews showed that brain structures located
in the rostral parts of the ventral stream of visual processing
(such as the infero-temporal (IT) cortices) or integrating
highly processed visual data with other sensory modalities
(such as the perirhinal and entorhinal cortices) are usually
disrupted in patients with category-specific semantic disorders
for living things. Data consistent with these views were also
obtained by Strauss et al. (2000) and by Luckhurst and Lloyd-
Jones (2001), who showed that temporal lobectomy patients
are disproportionately more impaired in naming living than
nonliving entities.
RESULTS OF FUNCTIONAL NEUROIMAGING INVESTIGATIONS
Data in agreement with this model were also obtained in a
series of neuroimaging studies by Grabowski et al. (2001), Devlin
et al. (2002), Tyler et al. (2004), Bright et al. (2005) and Moss
et al. (2005). These authors showed that the human perirhinal
cortex and neighboring anterior temporal structures provide
the neural infrastructure for living categories. For instance,
Devlin et al. (2002) entered data from seven PET studies into
a single multifactorial design which crossed category (living
vs. man-made) with a range of tasks and found that living
things activated medial aspects of the anterior temporal poles
bilaterally and that tools activated a left posterior middle temporal
region. On the other hand, Bright et al. (2005) reviewed
recent neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies and found
that the human perirhinal cortex and contiguous anteromedial
temporal structures provide the neural infrastructure for making
fine-grained discriminations among objects. This suggests that
damage within the perirhinal cortex may underlie the emergence
of category-specific semantic deficits for living things.
If we pass from living beings to artifacts, we see that lesions of
a network involving the infero-lateral part of the left frontal lobe,
the left inferior parietal lobe and the left middle temporal gyrus,
where different components of action schemata are represented
(see Saygin et al., 2004), provoke prevalent impairment for tools
and other man-made artifacts, whose knowledge is mainly based
upon active manipulation and physical contact with objects.
This claim is not only supported by the results of Gainotti’s
(2000) systematic review of the anatomical correlates of category-
specific semantic disorders, but also by other more recent reviews
(e.g., Capitani et al., 2003; Kellenbach et al., 2003; Gainotti, 2005,
2013; Buxbaum and Kalénine, 2010; Campanella et al., 2010).
In conclusion, results of anatomo-clinical and of functional
neuroimaging investigations confirm that distinctive sources of
knowledge have a critical role in the construction of different
semantic categories and that the brain structures disrupted in a
given type of category-specific semantic disorder (or activated in
neuroimaging experiments using items from the same category)
overlap with areas of convergence of sensory-motor information
which has a major role in the construction of that category. The
main results of anatomo-clinical and of functional neuroimaging
investigations on the cerebral correlates of biological and artifact
categories are reported in Figure 1.
INBORN AND EXPERIENCE-DEPENDENT MODELS OF
CATEGORICAL BRAIN ORGANIZATION AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF GENDER-RELATED EFFECTS
THE DOMAINS OF KNOWLEDGE’ HYPOTHESIS
In previous sections of this review, we saw that the “embodied
cognition” theory (Barsalou, 2008) and the “sensory-motor
model of semantic knowledge”, (Gainotti, 2000, 2006;
Martin and Chao, 2001; Martin, 2007) can account for the
neuropsychological aspects of category-specific semantic
disorders (even if the evidence and the arguments that have
been made against those theories cannot be ignored) and allow
for correct predictions about the brain structures subsuming
specific categories of knowledge. Nevertheless, these models
are at variance with the “domains of knowledge’ hypothesis”,
proposed by Caramazza et al. (Caramazza, 1998; Caramazza
and Shelton, 1998; Capitani et al., 2003; Caramazza and Mahon,
2006), which assumes the existence of an “innate” categorical
organization of conceptual knowledge, and posits that category-
specific impairments for animals (potential predators), plant life
(possible source of food), and artifacts reflect the disruption of
innate brain networks, which are shaped by natural selection to
support rapid identification of objects that are very important for
survival. The distinction within “living beings” between category-
specific disorders for animals and plant life is certainly correct.
It is, indeed, supported by at least three sources of evidence:
(a) results of hierarchical cluster analyses used in feature listing
studies (e.g., Cree and McRae, 2003; Vigliocco et al., 2004 ) or in
investigations conducted using Likert scales (e.g., Gainotti et al.,
2009, 2013a; Hoffman and Lambon Ralph, 2013), which have
documented a tripartite organization of knowledge (with three
major clusters corresponding to animals, fruits and vegetables
and artifacts); (b) single case studies of patients showing a
selective impairment for animals (e.g., Damasio et al., 1990; Hart
and Gordon, 1992; De Renzi and Lucchelli, 1994; Caramazza and
Shelton, 1998; Blundo et al., 2006) or for fruits and vegetables
(e.g., Hart et al., 1985; Hanley et al., 1989; Farah and Wallace,
1992; Goldenberg, 1992; Forde et al., 1997; Kensinger et al.,
2003; Samson and Pillon, 2003; Siri et al., 2003); and (c) results
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FIGURE 1 | In the upper part of the figure are reported the left
hemisphere brain structures that play a critical role in the
representation of tools and other artifacts. Within this network, the
inferior frontal cortex subsumes action-related features, the inferior
parietal cortex is connected with somato-sensory information and the
middle temporal gyrus processes visual information, coming through the
dorsal stream of visual processing and concerning the objects’
movements. In the lower part of the figure are reported the connections
between the anterior temporal lobes, which bilaterally subsume the
representations of living beings and the sources of knowledge that mainly
contribute to the construction of these representations: visual and
auditory features for the category of animals and visual, gustatory and
olfactory features for the plant-life categories (flowers, fruits and
vegetables). Both right and left anterior temporal lobes are equally
involved in the representation of living beings because the perceptual
sources of knowledge on which these categories are based are bilaterally
represented. By contrast, the network subsuming tools and artifacts
knowledge is lateralized to the left hemisphere because the action-related
and somato-sensory information on which these categories are based
come (in right-handed subjects) from the right side of the body.
of a group study conducted by Capitani et al. (2009), which
showed that the anatomical locus of lesion is not exactly the same
in patients with selective disorders for animals and plant life
stimuli.
THE INTERPRETATION OF GENDER-RELATED EFFECTS
The claim that the difference between animals and plant life
categories is inborn and shaped by natural selection was, however,
questioned by Gainotti (2005, 2010). This author’s reviews
showed that only the distinction between biological and artifact
categories reflects an anatomically-based categorical organization
and that the discrepancy (within the living entities) between
animals and plant life categories is mainly due to gender and
social roles related familiarity factors. In fact, Gainotti’s (2005,
2010) reviews showed that in patients with category-specific
semantic impairments for living beings men were systematically
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more impaired with plant life categories and women were usually
more impaired with animals. The presence of a gender effect
was not unexpected, because an interaction between gender
and familiarity with different kinds of living and non-living
categories had already been documented by several authors. In
a normative study conducted by McKenna and Parry (1994) and
in later investigations conducted in normal subjects by Capitani
et al. (1999), Laws (1999, 2000, 2004), Albanese et al. (2000),
Barbarotto et al. (2002) and Funnell et al. (2006), men were
usually more familiar with artifacts and women with living things.
Furthermore, a detailed analysis of data gathered in normal
subjects suggested a further gender by category interaction even
within biological categories, because men were more proficient
with animals and women with fruits and vegetables (McKenna
and Parry, 1994; Albanese et al., 2000; Laws, 2004; Barbarotto
et al., 2008; Cameron et al., 2008). What was surprising, however,
was the size of the gender effect. In fact, in Gainotti’s (2005)
review 18 out of the 19 patients who showed a selective
impairment for fruits and vegetables were men, whereas 7 out of
the 9 patients who showed a prevalent impairment for animals
were women. Gainotti (2005) and Marra et al. (2007) explained
these gender effects on the basis of the greater familiarity that
men might have with tools and with certain kinds of animals
(probably because they are more involved in hunting activities)
and women for fruits and vegetables (probably because of their
cooking activities).
An attempt to reconcile these gender effects with inborn
models of categorical brain organization was proposed by Laws
(2000, 2004) and developed by Laiacona et al. (2006). According
to Laws (2000, 2004), greater development of brain circuits
dealing with tools and animals in men and with fruits and
vegetables in women may have been produced by the main
subsistence activities of men (hunting) and women (gathering).
Refining this line of thought, Laiacona et al. (2006), proposed
that the evolutionary pressures which prompted the development
of different brain networks dedicated to animals, plant life
and tools might also have provided each gender with more
efficient cognitive representations of their main working and
foraging targets (i.e., tools and animals for men and fruits
and vegetables for women). This inborn account of gender
effects, based on evolutionary pressures is, however, at variance
with the fact that gender effects do not respect the boundaries
between artifacts, animals and plant life categories. Several
authors (e.g., Albanese et al., 2000; Moreno-Martinez et al.,
2008; Gainotti et al., 2013b) have shown that in the artifact
categories, men fare better with tools and women with furniture
and kitchen utensils. An objection that could be raised to the
“greater familiarity hypothesis” is that, given that in developed
countries men no longer hunt and women share their cooking
activities with men, gender-related categorical effects should have
disappeared by now. This, however, is exactly what was found
by Moreno-Martinez et al. (2008) and by Gainotti et al. (2010,
2013b). No difference was observed by Moreno-Martinez et al.
(2008) or by Gainotti et al. (2010) in any of the categories
considered in their studies when young males and females (who
belonged to a generation in which the traditional social roles
have almost completely disappeared) were taken into account.
The situation changed, however, when elderly subjects were
investigated. In Moreno-Martinez et al.’s (2008) study, elderly
females obtained better results with flowers, vegetables and
kitchen utensils, whereas elderly males obtained better scores with
musical instruments. In Gainotti et al.’s (2013b) study elderly men
showed a greater familiarity for animals and women for flowers.
Furthermore the suggestion advanced by Marra et al. (2007) that
the higher male familiarity with animals might derive from their
hunting activities was confirmed by Scotti et al. (2010). Then, they
subdivided them into various categories and showed that males
were more familiar with hunted animals.
In conclusion, data showing that gender effects do not respect
the boundaries between artifacts, animals and plant life categories
are clearly more consistent with an experience-dependent
interpretation of gender-related asymmetries (Gainotti, 2005,
2010; Marra et al., 2007) than with the assumption that
evolutionary pressures may have provided each gender with the
most efficient cognitive representations of their main working and
foraging targets (Laws, 2000, 2004; Laiacona et al., 2006).
INBORN AND EXPERIENCE-DEPENDENT INTERPRETATIONS
OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TOOL KNOWLEDGE AND
THE LEFT VENTRAL FRONTO-PARIETAL AREAS
In Section “Neuropsychological Studies of Category-Specific
Disorders Tend to Support Sensorimotor Models of Semantic
Knowledge” of this review, regarding the functional knowledge
of objects, I pointed out that Buxbaum et al. (2000) and
Buxbaum and Saffran (2002) distinguished between knowledge
of the function of objects and that of their manipulation,
suggesting that “manipulation” (being related to a sensorimotor
activity), might be the component more tightly linked to the
“differential weighting” hypothesis. Kellenbach et al. (2003)
and Boronat et al. (2005) confirmed this hypothesis in two
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments.
They asked normal subjects to make judgments about actions
and functions associated with manipulable and non-manipulable
objects. Both studies showed that the left inferior frontal and
parietal areas responded more strongly to actions (vs. functions)
and to manipulable (vs. non-manipulable) objects. These results
confirmed that brain regions specialized for sensory-motor
functions play a critical role in the representation of tools and
other manmade objects.
THE “EMBODIED COGNITION HYPOTHESIS” AND THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN MANIPULATION, TOOL KNOWLEDGE AND LEFT VENTRAL
FRONTO-PARIETAL AREAS
Some theoretical models have been advanced to explain the
relationship between manipulation, tool knowledge and left
ventral fronto-parietal areas. One of these models is based
on a strong version of the “embodied cognition hypothesis”
(Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005) and maintains
that the conceptual processing of tools necessarily involves the
retrieval or simulation of the movements associated with tool
usage. According to this view, motor programs are run during
object recognition and are necessary to ground the conceptual
knowledge of objects. One prediction that can be made on the
basis of this hypothesis is that loss or impairment of motor
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programs concerning the use of tools should be associated with
disruption of the corresponding conceptual knowledge. But data
obtained in brain-damaged patients have provided results that
were inconsistent with this strong version of the “embodied
cognition theory”. Thus, research conducted in patients with
apraxia, whose performance is impaired when they imitate
observed actions, by using objects or pantomiming their use from
visual presentation, has shown that the ability to use objects
may be much more impaired than naming them or knowing
their function (Buxbaum et al., 2000; Buxbaum and Saffran,
2002; Rosci et al., 2003; Negri et al., 2007). Furthermore, results
of two recent studies are at variance with the strong version
of the “embodied cognition theory”. In one of these studies,
Arévalo et al. (2012) presented left hemisphere stroke patients
with pictures and words representing objects and actions typically
associated with use of the hand, mouth and foot. They correlated
results obtained on these tasks with data obtained from voxel-
based lesion-symptom mapping analyses, but found no support
for a correlation between body parts involved in the use of objects
and somatotopically organized locus of damage. In another single
case study, Garcea et al. (2013) reported the detailed investigation
of a patient with a large left hemisphere lesion whose object
knowledge was relatively spared in spite of a severe motor
(action production) defect and impaired conceptual knowledge
of actions. Taken together, the few studies that have used lesion
data to test predictions deriving from a strong version of the
“embodied cognition theory” provided data inconsistent with this
theory.
THE INNATELY DETERMINED CONNECTIVITY PATTERNS SUGGESTED
BY “THE DISTRIBUTED DOMAIN-SPECIFIC HYPOTHESIS”
Other theoretical models acknowledge that motor programs
associated with tool use have an important role in the
construction of tool representation, but deny that a necessary and
sufficient relationship exists between the re-enactment of these
sensory-motor processes and tool knowledge.
These models are the “domains of knowledge” hypothesis,
(Caramazza, 1998; Caramazza and Shelton, 1998; Mahon and
Caramazza, 2001, 2003; Caramazza and Mahon, 2006) and
the “sensory-motor model of semantic knowledge”, (Gainotti
et al., 1995; Chao et al., 1999; Gainotti, 2000, 2006; Martin
and Chao, 2001; Martin, 2007), which have already been
discussed in previous sections of the present review. The basic
difference between these two models is that the domains of
knowledge hypothesis is an innatist model and the sensory-
motor model of conceptual knowledge maintains that categorical
brain organization is experience-dependent. In fact, the domains
of knowledge hypothesis’, which in its first formulation did
not consider as relevant the anatomical correlates of brain
categorical organization, after the publication of data obtained
by Gainotti (2000, 2005) in patients with category-specific
semantic disorders and by Kellenbach et al. (2003), Tyler et al.
(2004), Bright et al. (2005) and Moss et al. (2005) in functional
neuroimaging experiments, acknowledged that the neural
substrate of each domain of knowledge consists of a network
where the information most relevant for that category converges.
However, this model, called “the distributed domain-specific
hypothesis” by Mahon and Caramazza (2009, 2011), argues
that innately determined connectivity patterns mediate the
integration of information critical for the organization of each
domain of knowledge; by contrast, the sensory-motor model of
conceptual knowledge holds that each category results from the
convergence of different sources of knowledge whose organization
is experience-dependent. According to the distributed domain-
specific hypothesis (Mahon and Caramazza, 2009, 2011), a
domain-specific neural system is a network of brain structures in
which each region processes a different type of sensory, motor,
affective or conceptual information about the same category of
objects. Furthermore, the computations that must be performed
on items in the same category are sufficiently specific to merit a
specialized process. For instance, there is a strong need to integrate
motor-relevant information with visual information for tools and
other artifacts; this need is less strong for animals and faces.
Similarly, there is a strong need to integrate affective information,
biological motion processing and visual form information for
animals and conspecifics; this need is less strong for tools and
other artifacts. Thus, supporters of the distributed domain-
specific hypothesis propose that specialization for faces in the
lateral fusiform area of the ventral visual stream occurs because
this region of the brain is connected with the amygdale and the
superior temporal sulcus, which are important for the extraction
of socially relevant information. By contrast, specialization for
tools and manipulable objects is driven by the connectivity
between the inferior frontal and parietal cortex, which subserve
object manipulation and regions of the medial fusiform gyrus,
that are involved in the visual processing of tools.
DATA SUGGESTING THE INNATE NATURE OF THE CATEGORICAL BRAIN
ORGANIZATION AND OBJECTIONS RAISED TO THE HYPOTHESIS THAT
INNATE CONNECTIVITY PATTERNS MAY UNDERLIE CATEGORICAL
ORGANIZATION
Strong empirical data supporting the innate nature of these
patterns of connectivity come from work indicating that
congenitally blind subjects show activation for words (presented
in Braille) in the same regions of the ventral stream that are
activated by visually presented words in sighted individuals
(Buchel et al., 1998). Furthermore, Mahon et al. (2009) showed
that the same medial-to-lateral bias in category preferences for
artifacts vs. animals, which is present in the ventral surface of
the temporo-occipital cortex in sighted individuals (Chao et al.,
1999; Noppeney et al., 2006; Mahon et al., 2007), is also present
in congenitally blind subjects. Mahon et al. (2009) suggested
that, if visual experience is unnecessary for the emergence of
category-specificity in the ventral stream, innate connectivity
between regions of the ventral stream and other regions of
the brain could drive category-specificity. Some objections have,
however, been raised to this claim. First, several authors (e.g.,
Downing et al., 2006; Mechelli et al., 2006; Chouinard et al.,
2008; Pourtois et al., 2009; Cate et al., 2011; Taylor and
Downing, 2011) have challenged the specificity of the medial-
to-lateral bias in category preferences. Second, according to
Kiefer and Pulvermüller (2012) these data do not necessarily
suggest that innate connections underlyie the organization of
object knowledge, because the brain of congenitally blind patients
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is subject to many plastic changes in which visual areas are
activated by tactile (Sadato et al., 1996; Röder et al., 1997) and
auditory (Klinge et al., 2010; Collignon et al., 2011) information.
It is, therefore, possible that tactile and auditory processing
of biological and artifact stimuli recruits “visual” areas in the
course of cortical reorganization and leads to the extraction of
category-specific object properties, similarly to what occurs in
visual exploration. Authors who argue that innately determined
connectivity patterns mediate the integration of information
critical for the organization of each domain of knowledge do
not deny that the brains of blind subjects are different from
the brains of sighted participants in important ways nor that
“visual” regions in the blind process tactile information (e.g.,
Mahon et al., 2009; Amedi et al., 2010). In fact, they hold that
the relevant finding for constraining models is not the format of
the information that is represented but rather its organization.
On the other hand, it can be objected that, to devise a task
that could be performed by both sighted and blind individuals,
Mahon et al. (2009) asked participants to make size judgments
about stimuli that were presented as auditory words. These size-
judgment tasks can be performed on the basis of both visual
and somato-sensory kinesthetic information. Now, if we look
at the original data of Mahon et al. (2009), we see that only
activation concerning the artifacts, which emerged in the mesial
parts of the ventral surface of the occipital-temporal cortex, was
strong and spatially extensive; by contrast, activation concerning
living beings (in the lateral parts of the same cortical areas)
was weak and limited to small spots. This may have been
because congenitally blind participants have disproportionately
more somato-sensory experience, which is much more relevant
for processing the shapes of nonliving (e.g., a fork, a car) than
living things.
Other objections to the innatist model of the distributed
domain-specific hypothesis come from results, reported by Baker
et al. (2007) in humans and by Srihasam et al. (2012) in
monkeys. Baker et al. (2007) showed that category-specific
regions in the ventral visual pathway, such as the “visual word
form area” (VWFA), can be created through visual experience,
without a strong genetic predisposition for that specific selectivity.
These authors used high resolution fMRI to scan both Hebrew
and non-Hebrew readers while they viewed English words,
Hebrew words, Chinese characters and line drawings and found
a small region in the left hemisphere fusiform gyrus, that
selectively responded to letter strings. This region responded
more strongly to Hebrew words in Hebrew readers than in
non- Hebrew readers, indicating that the striking selectivity of
this region for one class of stimuli originates from extensive
experience with that stimulus class. Srihasam et al. (2012)
conducted experimental studies in monkeys to evaluate whether
the existence of dedicated cortical domains necessarily means
that the corresponding abilities are innate, or whether these
domains can be formed or refined by interactions between
genetic programs and common early experience. They showed
that intensive early, but not late, experience caused the formation
of category-selective regions in the macaque temporal lobe for
stimuli (i.e., letters and numbers) never encountered naturally
by monkeys. Their explanation of these results was that thanks
to a self-organizing activity-dependent Hebbian mechanism,
intensive early experience drives the segregation of category-
specific domains in the cortical areas of the IT cortex. It must
be acknowledged, on the other hand, that the positions of
Mahon and Caramazza (2009, 2011) were supported by a set
of recent fMRI data from blind individuals obtained by Striem-
Amit et al. (2012). These authors, taught congenitally blind
adults to read and recognize complex images using sounds that
topographically represented images (“soundscapes”). The blind
subjects selectively activated the VWFA during the processing
of letter soundscapes relative to textures or visually complex
object categories. Therefore, similar to the blind subjects tested
by Mahon and Caramazza, the VWFA of their blind participants
showed category selectivity regardless of the input sensory
modality, visual experience, and long-term familiarity or expertise
with the script. Striem-Amit et al. (2012) thus concluded that,
although the VWFA is located in classical “visual” regions of
the brain, the sensory format of the stimulus might already be
“abstracted away” when the information arrives in the fusiform
gyrus, allowing the same information to be processed by that
particular structure, even when it is channeled through other
modalities.
In any case, the recruitment of occipital regions in the
congenitally blind, the ability of the brain to reorganize itself
due to experience and the observation of specialized cognitive
modules in the occipital cortex of congenitally blind, similar to
those observed in the sighted, are still the subject of intense
debates (see Held et al., 2011; Ricciardi and Pietrini, 2011;
Struiksma et al., 2011; Bedny et al., 2012; Collignon et al., 2013;
Peelen et al., 2014 for different viewpoints on these subjects).
In conclusion, data indicating that the medial-to-lateral bias
in category preferences for artifacts vs. animals, which is present
in the visual “ventral stream” of sighted individuals, is also present
in congenitally blind subjects certainly suggest that, if visual
experience is not necessary for the emergence of this categorical
neural organization, innate patterns of connectivity must mediate
the integration of information critical for the organization
of each category. These suggestions must, however, be taken
with caution, because an interaction has been hypothesized
in critical periods of development between an inborn general
brain organization (allowing the connection between the main
sensory-motor, cognitive, executive and affective brain structures)
and an experience-dependent actualization or reshaping of this
basic brain design. Furthermore, data obtained in humans and
in monkeys suggest that, thanks to a self-organizing activity-
dependent Hebbian mechanism, intensive early experience drives
the segregation of category-specific domains within cortical areas
in the IT cortex.
THE IMPORTANCE OF PRIOR EXPERIENCE IN THE CORTICAL
REPRESENTATION OF OBJECTS
Several recent investigations tried to assess the importance
of prior perceptual and motor experience in the cortical
representation of previously familiar or unknown objects, whose
knowledge had been learned through intensive training. These
lines of research will be analyzed in some detail. First, the results
of investigations that studied the influence of experience with
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previously familiar objects or tasks will be reported and then
the results of experimental studies that evaluated the influence of
training on previously unfamiliar material.
THE INFLUENCE OF EXPERIENCE WITH PREVIOUSLY FAMILIAR
OBJECTS
The first line of research was pursued by Hoenig et al. (2011)
in the auditory domain and by Yee et al. (2013) in the
motor domain. Hoenig et al. (2011) started from the premise
that professional musicians constitute a very good model for
understanding experience-dependent plasticity in the human
brain and investigated whether this neuroplasticity might extend
beyond basic perceptual and motor functions and shape the
semantic representation of musical instruments. Using fMRI,
they showed that in musicians (but not in musical laypersons)
conceptual processing of visually presented musical instruments
activates the auditory association cortex encompassing the right
posterior superior temporal gyrus, which is also recruited in the
auditory perception of real sounds. Therefore, experience-driven
neuroplasticity in musicians is not confined to alterations of
perceptual and motor maps but also leads to the establishment
of higher-level semantic representations for musical instruments.
Yee et al. (2013) assessed the extent to which previous motor
experience is part of an object’s representation. They showed:
(a) that when the hands are engaged in a task involving
movements that are incompatible with those used to interact
with frequently manipulated objects, it is more difficult to make
verbal judgements about those objects; and (b) that the amount
of manual experience with the objects determines the amount of
interference.
THE INFLUENCE OF TRAINING ON PREVIOUSLY UNFAMILIAR MATERIAL
The second research strategy, which started from the fact that
the history of previous sensory-motor experience with familiar
objects cannot be controlled, was based on the use of previously
unfamiliar material and the administration of different types of
extensive training with these objects. This line of research was
followed by James and Gauthier (2003), Creem-Regehr et al.
(2007), Kiefer et al. (2007), Weisberg et al. (2007) and Bellebaum
et al. (2013).
James and Gauthier (2003) asked participants to learn
associations between novel objects (“greebles”) and verbal labels
of object features referring to a given modality (auditory and
object motion). In a sequential matching task at test, the authors
found stronger activity to objects associated with auditory words
(“buzzes”) in the superior temporal gyrus, which responds to
sounds in general, and stronger activity for objects associated
with motion words (“hops”) in the superior posterior temporal
sulcus, which is sensitive to motion processing. Similarly, Kiefer
et al. (2007) assessed the plasticity of conceptual representations
by training subjects with novel objects under different training
conditions. In one class of stimuli object categorization was based
on a detail feature, affording a particular action. During training,
participants were asked either to make an action pantomime
toward the detail feature or simply to pay attention to it
by pointing to it with their index finger. In a categorization
task at test, the neural correlates of the acquired conceptual
representations were assessed. In the pantomime group, in which
a meaningful action was performed towards the object during
training, early activation was found in the frontal areas; but in
the pointing training group, in which the action during training
was not related to the object, these effects were absent. These
results show that action information contributes to conceptual
processing according to the specific learning experience, and
suggest that conceptual representations are established by the
learning-based formation of cell assemblies in different cortical
areas. On the other hand, Creem-Regehr et al. (2007) used fMRI
to investigate the influence of action knowledge associated with
viewing, grasping, and using novel graspable objects. Participants
were trained to perform complex actions associated with novel
objects (“tools”) and had experience manipulating other visually
similar novel objects (“shapes”). During scanning participants
viewed, imagined grasping, and imagined using the objects.
The greatest differences between “tools” and “shapes” were
found in the “using” condition, in which greater effect sizes
were observed for tools vs. shapes in the left inferior parietal
lobule (IPL), pre-supplementary motor cortex (pre-SMA) and,
marginally, in the left ventral premotor cortex (VPM). These
results suggest that representations of tools are constructed on
the basis of complex action schemata, which recruit processes
related to graspability, action plans and use of objects. Similar
conclusions were reached by Weisberg et al. (2007), who assessed
the learning of tool-like functions for novel objects in an fMRI
experiment in which subjects had to visually match pictures of
novel objects before and after extensive training in the use of
these objects to perform specific tool-like tasks. Compared with
a pre-training baseline, activity increased after training in brain
regions associated with motion (left middle temporal gyrus) and
with manipulation (left intraparietal sulcus and premotor area)
of tools and other manipulable objects. Furthermore, activations
in the ventral temporo-occipital cortex became more focal after
training. Specifically, although activity was widespread in the
fusiform gyrus prior to training, activity, after training it was
markedly increased in the medial portion of the fusiform gyrus,
which is associated with identifying common tools, and was
markedly reduced in the more lateral parts of the fusiform
gyrus (i.e., in regions preferring animate objects like animals and
faces).
Finally, Bellebaum et al. (2013) used fMRI to study the impact
of different types of object-related sensorimotor experiences
on the neural representations of novel objects, by contrasting
manipulation training (MTO) with visual training (VTO) and
absence of training (NTO). The post-training activity in the left
inferior/middle frontal gyrus and the left posterior IPL was higher
for MTO than for VTO and NTO, suggesting that manipulation
experience leads to greater activity specifically in regions of the
fronto-parietal cortex.
In conclusion, these studies assessing the importance of
perceptual and motor experience in the cortical representation
of previously familiar or of previously unknown objects, confirm
the importance of previous experience in the learning-based
formation of cortical cell assemblies subsuming the cortical
representation of concepts. The implication of these results is
that, if it is shown that experience shapes brain organization then
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there is evidence against inborn models. The problem with this
argument is that inborn models do not deny that experience
shapes brain organization i.e., that all of the content that an
individual represents comes from experience. The question is
whether the basic organization by category is something that
depends only on experience or also on endogenous constraints.
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND TENTATIVE CONCLUDING
REMARKS
If we try to summarize the data gathered in the present review,
which are synthesized in Table 1 (by integrating the results of the
different lines of research with some of the more important papers
illustrating these lines) we can say that there are two main reasons
why it is difficult to choose between the experience-dependent
and the inborn models of conceptual representations.
The first reason is that both models acknowledge that
experience shapes brain organization and that all of the content
an individual represents comes from experience. The question is,
therefore, whether the basic organization by category is something
that depends only on experience or also on endogenous
constraints. The second reason is that some of the empirical
data gathered in this survey stress the importance of experience-
related factors, other data suggest the existence of endogenous
constraints and still other data do not clearly support either
of these mechanisms. In the data stressing the importance of
experience-related factors, I would mention: (a) the sizeable
gender effects observed by Gainotti (2005) in reviewing case
reports of category-specific semantic impairment; and (b) results
of experimental studies which have shown that perceptual and
motor experience play a critical role in the cortical representation
of previously familiar or unknown objects.
Gender-related categorical effects were explained by Gainotti
(2005) as due to men’s greater familiarity with tools and with
certain kinds of animals (because they are more involved in
manual and hunting activities) and women’s greater familiarity
with fruits and vegetables (probably as a result of their cooking
activities). An inborn account of these gender effects, proposed by
Laws (2000, 2004) and by Laiacona et al. (2006) is at variance with
the fact that these effects do not respect the boundaries between
artifacts, animals and plant life categories. The observation that
within the artifact categories men fare better with tools and
women with “furniture” and “kitchen utensils” (Albanese et al.,
2000; Moreno-Martinez et al., 2008; Gainotti et al., 2013b)
is consistent with an “experience-dependent” interpretation of
gender-related asymmetries, but not with the assumption that
evolutionary pressures may have provided each gender with the
most efficient cognitive representations for their main work and
foraging targets.
As for the importance of perceptual and motor experience
in the cortical representation of previously familiar or unknown
objects, investigations which have studied the influence of
experience with previously familiar objects (Hoenig et al., 2011;
Yee et al., 2013) and results of experimental studies which have
evaluated the influence of training on previously unfamiliar
material (James and Gauthier, 2003; Creem-Regehr et al., 2007;
Kiefer et al., 2007; Weisberg et al., 2007; Bellebaum et al.,
2013) have consistently confirmed the importance of previous
experience in the learning-based formation of the cortical cell
assemblies that subsume the cortical representation of concepts.
In the data suggesting the existence of endogenous constraints,
the most important come from work (Mahon et al., 2009)
indicating that the medial-to-lateral bias in category preferences
for artifacts vs. animals, which is present in the ventral
surface of the temporo-occipital cortex in sighted individuals,
is also present in congenitally blind subjects. According to
Mahon and Caramazza (2011), this observation suggests that,
if visual experience is not necessary for the emergence of
a categorical neural organization, then innate patterns of
connectivity must mediate the integration of information critical
for the organization of each category.
More inconclusive, though mainly supporting the experience-
dependent hypothesis, is the fact that the anatomical structures
disrupted in a given type of category-specific semantic disorder
correspond to the areas of convergences of the sensory-motor
information which has a major role in the construction of that
category. This observation which (as we have seen in a previous
section of this survey) was predicted by the “sensory-motor model
of semantic knowledge”, is not necessarily at variance with an
innatistic model, if we assume that the convergence of critical
sensory-motor information in well defined cortical areas may
have taken place in the course of evolution.
Therefore, even if the rationalist approach did not explicitely
acknowledge that the empiricist approach was correct, it made
similar predictions, leading to the conclusion that at the present
state of knowledge it is impossible to choose between experience-
dependent and inborn models of conceptual representations.
This interlocutory conclusion may be necessary because
the question about experience-dependent vs. inborn semantic
categories cannot be an either/or issue and both inborn features
and experience shape semantic categories. Nevertheless, the
weight of these complementary determinants of conceptual
representations has yet to be explored. For instance, a recent
study of genetic and environmental influences on the VWFA and
the fusiform face area (FFA) has shown that activation of the
VWFA is partially under genetic control, whereas activation of the
FFA is primarily influenced by individual experience (Pinel et al.,
2014). These results are obviously at variance with those obtained
by Striem-Amit et al. (2012), which are reported in Section
“Data Suggesting the Innate Nature of the Categorical Brain
Organization and Objections Raised to the Hypothesis that Innate
Connectivity Patterns May Underlie Categorical Organization”,
in a discussion of the data that support the innate nature of
categorical brain organization.
In my opinion, it is likely that only some basic mechanisms,
linked to the general architecture of the brain and to the
connections between structures processing perceptual and action-
related information are inborn and that more specific contents
of knowledge is experience-dependent. On the other hand, since
conceptual categories are constructed on the basis of cortical
areas that process perceptual and action-related information and
their interconnections, it is not easy to disentangle the innate
processing systems from the experience-dependent contents of
their joint action. It is only possible to highlight the results
of studies that have consistently confirmed the importance of
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previous experience in the learning-based formation of cortical
cell assemblies, which subsume the cortical representation of
previously familiar or newly learned concepts.
In any case, even if both inborn features and experience shape
semantic categories, the question of the relative contribution
of novel information and of predefined structures (i.e., specific
brain networks) remains unresolved. It also remains unclear
whether any pre-quantitative model can determine the relative
contribution of inborn and experience-dependent sources of
influence (Hofmann and Jacobs, 2014).
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Since I indicated in the foregoing tentative concluding remarks
that the question about experience-dependent vs. inborn
semantic categories cannot be an either/or issue and that both
inborn features and experience shape semantic categories, I
feel it is necessary to indicate some research directions in the
fields of Artificial Intelligence and genomic imaging, which
might provide ways to address these issues in the future. As
to the first direction, a pioneering study by Mitchell et al.
(2008) has shown that brain activation in response to a line
drawing of a concrete concept and the corresponding name
can be predicted if semantic feature values for that concept
and the patterns of brain activation for other concepts are
given. Since then, multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) has
become an inductive method for determining brain sites that
selectively respond to particular semantic features and these
analyses are becoming more and more category-specific. Pereira
et al. (2013), for instance, used a corpus of a few thousand
Wikipedia articles about concrete high-imageability concepts to
produce a low-dimensional semantic feature representation of
those concepts. They showed that these features can be used
to uncover similarity relations in brain activation for different
concepts, which parallel relations in behavioral data from human
subjects. If strong similarities could be uncovered between sighted
and congenitally blind individuals in the patterns of brain
activation for different abstract and concrete, high-imageability
and low-imageability words, this could strengthen the inborn
models of conceptual representation. As for the second direction,
it can be argued that if genes determine functional imaging
(e.g., Muñoz et al., 2009), this might help to illuminate the
degree to which semantic category development is genetically
pre-determined. For example, to further explore the finding
that higher-order semantic impairments are implicated in formal
thought disorders (FTD) in schizophrenia (e.g., Dwyer et al.,
2014), Nicodemus et al. (2014) combined a computational
linguistic approach with a candidate gene approach to examine
the genetic architecture of a category fluency task in patients
with schizophrenia. It is, therefore, possible that the weight of
inborn and experience-dependent factors in the construction of
conceptual categories will be clarified by these and other, similar
research directions.
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